Before you read this

What follows is evidence of irrevocable harm being done to everyone alive. To read it is to cross a threshold; to set it aside is to remain on this side of it. Both choices are legitimate. Make yours knowingly.

Threshold is a proposal in development. This document is part of its working canon.

Power is the problem

Plastic entered commercial use in the 1950s on a promise of necessity. The promise was delivered. Our lives are measurably better.

The question of what to do with the material when it was no longer in use was never asked, and was never resolved. It became rubbish, thrown away.

There is no such place as away. There is only everywhere. Two billion tonnes in seventy-five years, and everywhere now includes our blood.

This was known, measured, and written about as a threat to life on earth for over fifty years. The facts are done. The research is done. The understanding is done.

What has not been done is to stop it.

For half a century, every pathway has failed. Regulation has been outpaced. Voluntary pledges have been broken. Advocacy has been absorbed. Markets have not responded. Litigation has resolved single cases while the system continued.

The reason is not ignorance, and it is not lack of will. The reason is power. The wealth created by plastic does not want the wealth to stop, and has the resources to ensure it does not.

That is what we found out.

The Threshold is what follows.

A verified, legally usable, institutionally endorsed evidence base, built by the people who carry the harm in their bodies. Every observation scored for reliability. Chain of custody from phone to proceeding. A cross-stakeholder deliberation that produces ranked interventions on permanent record. An evidence infrastructure built upstream of the actors who will eventually use it, ready before they need it.

Not protest. Not policy. Not litigation. The architecture that makes all three forceful enough, sooner.

The Threshold is still a proposal. Its purpose is to make the cost of continued suppression exceed the cost of accountability. The threshold will be crossed. The Threshold is built to be ready when it is.

THE THRESHOLD SUMMIT

The Output Compact · Futures Intelligence · Inaction Ledger

What the programme produces · what it guarantees · what happens if nothing does

Output Compact | **Inaction Ledger** | **Possible Futures**

OUTPUT COMPACT

DOCUMENT	Output Compact and Futures Intelligence · Season 1
PART OF	The Threshold Summit programme proposal v5.0
DOMAIN	thresholdsummit.org
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FUTURES

The core proposition

This programme produces evidence-based policy instruments, built by the people who have to implement them, and delivered into institutions that have already agreed to receive them.

That sentence is the whole argument. Everything else in this section explains what it means in practice, what the programme can honestly guarantee, what it cannot promise, and why this particular combination of design choices gives it a real chance of making a difference at a moment when real differences are still possible.

> Most policy initiatives fail for three reasons: their outputs arrive too late to influence the relevant decision; nobody owns them once they are published; and there is no institutional pressure to engage with them. This programme is designed to eliminate all three failure modes by design, not by hope.

1 The Output Compact

What this programme commits to producing — and what it will not promise

The Output Compact is the programme's binding commitment to its funders, partners, and participants. It describes what will be produced, by whom, in what form, for whom, and when. It also states clearly what will not be promised — because a programme that overpromises is a programme nobody trusts.

TIER 1 — HARD GUARANTEES

These will be delivered. They are within the programme's control.

1. Output Guarantee — policy instruments in defined format

The programme will produce a minimum of five and a maximum of eight policy-ready initiative descriptions, each in a standardised format: the intervention described, the evidence base cited, the stakeholder coalition that supports it, the feasibility constraints identified, the implementation pathway proposed, and the monitoring indicators specified. These are instruments, not recommendations. They are designed to be handed to a legislative drafter or an institutional policy team and used without further translation.

Commitment: the white paper will contain a minimum of five completed initiative instruments delivered at month 12. The final report at month 24 will contain the updated and finalised set.

2. Participation Guarantee — balanced authorship

The initiative instruments will carry the authorship of a balanced stakeholder group. The twelve simulation participants will represent at minimum: three from industry and commercial sectors (manufacturer, brand owner, insurer); three from policy and governance (regulator, diplomat, municipal authority); three from science and health (scientist, health economist, litigation funder); and three from civil society and affected communities (young activist, farmer, recycler). The pre-play constituency consultations will document the views of at least 240 real-world stakeholders behind these twelve characters. The outputs are not the opinion of twelve individuals; they are the analysed findings of twelve institutional positions carrying real constituency mandates.

Commitment: the final report will include a constituency record documenting the consultation behind each character's position.

3. Transparency Guarantee — full decision trace

A complete record of how every finding was produced will be published alongside the findings themselves. This includes: all four rounds of anonymous Voting Round scores per statement; the outlier rationale record; the Matrix Assessment matrix and scenario outputs; the Multi-Criteria Mapping workshop transcripts; the Statement archive with full five-count vote records; the Fact/Opinion audit trail for every assertion in every published document; and the coalition map showing which stakeholder groups found common ground on which initiatives. Any reader who disputes a finding can trace it back to the exact data that produced it.

Commitment: the full decision trace dataset will be deposited with an academic research repository under open access terms at programme close.

4. Delivery Guarantee — pre-committed institutional recipients

The programme's outputs will be delivered to named institutions that have been identified, briefed, and have confirmed their willingness to formally review the outputs before the programme closes. This is not a list of organisations the programme hopes to approach. These are institutions that have signed a Letter of Intent before the Althing Round opens. The minimum requirement: one international or intergovernmental body; one national government ministry or agency; one major academic institution; one major civil society or research organisation.

Commitment: the Letters of Intent will be published as an appendix to the programme proposal before the first funder commitment is accepted.

TIER 2 — CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES

These are likely outcomes if the programme executes well. They cannot be guaranteed.

1. Convergence Probability — aligned interests and legitimacy

The programme's structured design significantly increases the probability that participants from genuinely different institutional positions will find common ground on at least some initiatives. The anonymity of the Voting Rounds, the structured argument mapping, the cross-impact analysis, and the four live deliberation events are all designed to surface alignment that institutional positions normally conceal. Based on comparable structured deliberation exercises, the probability of achieving consensus on at least three of the five to eight initiatives is high. The probability of unanimity on all initiatives is low and is not the goal. Documented minority positions with their reasoning intact are analytically more valuable than manufactured consensus.

Probability statement: we expect convergence on three to five of the initiative instruments. We expect documented productive disagreement on the remainder. Both outcomes are analytically valuable.

2. Policy Relevance — realistic constraints acknowledged

The presence of a regulator and a diplomat in the character roster is specifically designed to prevent the programme from producing technically elegant but politically undeliverable recommendations. The Regulator knows what the actual implementation constraints are. The Diplomat knows which treaty provisions are achievable. The programme's initiative instruments will include explicit declarations of the resistance elements identified — the political, commercial, and institutional forces that have historically blocked action on each instrument — and the conditions under which those resistance elements can be overcome.

Probability statement: we expect the outputs to be substantially more implementable than typical academic or civil society policy recommendations, because the people who implement policy have a seat at the table.

What this programme will NOT promise

Anyone promising these things is not running a programme. They are selling hope.

✕ Policy adoption

The programme cannot make governments, regulators, or institutions adopt its recommendations. No programme can. Anyone who promises this is lying. The programme produces recommendations; the political system decides what to do with them.

✕ Regulatory change

The programme cannot change a regulation, directive, or treaty. It can produce findings that provide the evidence base for change. The change itself is a political act that requires political will the programme does not control.

✕ Behavioural compliance

The programme cannot make industries, consumers, or institutions change their behaviour. It can make the cost of inaction visible, measurable, and attributable. What people choose to do with that visibility is their decision.

2 De-risking mechanisms

Why the programme delivers value even if policy fails — the four structural safeguards

The single most common objection to investing in policy programmes is: "What if the political system ignores it?" This section addresses that objection directly. The programme is designed so that even in the worst political scenario — complete institutional inaction — the investment produces substantial and durable value.

Mechanism 1

Dual output track

Policy findings AND documentary evidence — both produced simultaneously

The programme produces two parallel output streams . The first stream is the policy instruments — initiative descriptions designed for institutional uptake. The second stream is the documentary evidence — a feature-length documentary series and podcast that expose the same findings in a form designed for public audiences. If governments refuse to act, the documentary exists. If the documentary fails to move public opinion, the policy instruments exist. Each stream creates pressure for the other. Neither depends on the other's success.

Mechanism 2

Institutional anchoring

Pre-committed institutional recipients before the simulation *opens*

The programme secures Letters of Intent from named institutions before the Althing Round begins. These letters commit the institution to formally reviewing the outputs when delivered. This is the most important single risk-reduction mechanism in the programme. A policy instrument delivered to an institution that has already agreed to engage with it is categorically different from one sent unsolicited. At minimum: one intergovernmental body, one national agency, one academic institution, one civil society organisation.

Mechanism 3

Industry engagement pathway

Voluntary adoption when regulatory action stalls

The presence of the Producer, the Recycler, and the Brand Owner in the Althing Round creates a direct pathway to voluntary industry adoption. If the regulatory system fails to act on an initiative, the industry participants who helped design it retain the option to implement it unilaterally — as a competitive advantage, a liability mitigation strategy, or a regulatory anticipation move. The history of environmental regulation is full of cases where voluntary industry action preceded and ultimately triggered mandatory regulation. The programme creates the conditions for that sequence.

Mechanism 4

Iterative release

Phased publication increases uptake and reduces all-or-nothing risk

The programme does not release a single final report at the end and hope it lands. It releases findings continuously: the white paper at month 12 (the ranked initiative list), documentary episodes from month 8, the Inaction Ledger updated annually, the Predictive Declaration published at programme close. Each release creates a news event and an opportunity for institutional engagement. Each release tests which findings gain traction and allows the programme to invest more in communicating the ones that do. The final report at month 24 arrives into a world that has been receiving and discussing programme findings for 16 months.

The counter-attack problem — and why this model survives it

The most obvious strategy for antagonists running interference against this programme is to dismiss its findings as lobby noise — another advocacy exercise dressed up as independent research. This is precisely what happened to the three-million-signature petition at the INC-5 negotiations. Signatures were dismissed. The treaty failed.

This programme is specifically designed to be structurally immune to that dismissal. The counter to "it's just advocacy" is a complete, published decision trace: every score, every rationale, every outlier position with its reasoning, every coalition signal. The complete record is publicly available, methodologically documented, and deposited in an academic repository. A critic who claims the findings are lobby noise must then explain why a petrochemical executive, a litigation funder, and a regulator scored the same initiative above the consensus threshold in four rounds of anonymous structured deliberation. The transparency is the counter-attack defence.

The second counter is the Inaction Ledger and the Predictive Declaration (see Section 4). When antagonists claim that inaction is acceptable, the programme has a running, evidence-based account of what inaction has already cost and a forward-dated declaration of what it will cost. The burden shifts: it is no longer the programme that must prove action is necessary; it is the antagonist who must explain why the published costs of inaction are acceptable.

3 Why this model has a real chance

Five design choices that separate this from everything that has failed

Most policy initiatives that attempt to address complex systemic problems fail. Understanding why they fail is a precondition for designing something that does not. This section addresses the five most common failure modes and explains exactly how the programme is designed to avoid each one.

Failure mode	Why it kills most programmes	How this programme avoids it
Outputs arrive too late	A final report published after a treaty conference, an election, or a market shift has missed its window. By the time findings are polished and approved, the decision has been made.	The programme releases findings continuously from month 8 onwards. The white paper at month 12 is designed to be available before the next major treaty round. The iterative release mechanism means every publication cycle creates a new window for institutional engagement.
No one owns the outputs	Findings are published by an organisation with no constituency, no institutional relationships, and no follow-through capacity. The outputs sit on a website. The organisation moves on to its next project.	The expert council is recruited before the white paper is released. They are the named institutional owners of the findings. The alumni network of participants continues to advocate post-close. The Letters of Intent from institutional recipients create accountability for engagement.
No pressure exists	Without public visibility and institutional accountability, there is no cost to ignoring expert findings. The path of least resistance is always inaction.	The Poll cascade creates graduated public pressure at exactly the right institutional levels: parliamentary representatives, medical professionals, municipal governments, retailers, institutional investors. The Inaction Ledger makes the cost of ignoring findings continuously visible and attributable.
Stakeholders are consulted, not embedded	Traditional consultation asks stakeholders to comment on someone else's proposal. They provide feedback, it is noted, and the original proposal proceeds with cosmetic adjustments. Stakeholders feel used, not heard.	The Althing Round embeds stakeholders as co-authors of the findings from the beginning. The Producer who participated in the programme and helped design the levy instrument is in a fundamentally different position than the Producer asked to comment on a levy proposal designed without them.
Institutions are approached after the fact	Publishing findings and then approaching institutions to adopt them reverses the necessary sequence. Institutions asked to adopt findings they had no hand in producing will almost always decline.	The Letters of Intent are secured before the Althing Round opens. Institutions receive updates throughout the programme. The expert council is engaged from month 12. By the time the final outputs are delivered, the institutional recipients have been watching the findings emerge for a year and a half.

The single most important action before programme launch

Secure one Institutional Letter of Intent

A Letter of Intent is a short document from a named institution — a government ministry, a university, a major research body, or a think tank — stating that it will formally review the programme's outputs when delivered. It is not an endorsement. It is not a commitment to adopt recommendations. It is a commitment to engage.

Once you can say: "The programme's outputs will be formally reviewed by [Institution X]" — everything changes. Funders engage because their investment has a named destination. Experts respond because their work has a named audience. Media interest increases because the story has an endpoint. The credibility of the programme jumps by an order of magnitude.

Target institutions for initial approach:

- UNEP — United Nations Environment Programme · Geneva (treaty process owner)
- European Commission Directorate-General for Environment · Brussels
- UK Environment Agency · or DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs)
- A major public health institution with plastic exposure research programme (e.g. National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, or equivalent)
- A major academic law faculty with environmental law programme (e.g. Columbia, LSE, Sciences Po)

The Letter of Intent is a one-page document. The Lead Architect drafts it. The Legal Counsel reviews it. The target institution signs it. This is the first deliverable of the pre-funding phase.

4 The Predictive Declaration of Possible Outcomes

What happens at 2, 5, 10, and 25 years if nothing changes — and what changes if the programme's instruments are adopted

The Predictive Declaration is a standalone analytical output produced from the programme's scenario work. It is not a press release. It is a dated, evidence-based, Fact/Opinion-audited declaration of what the best available analysis says will happen at four time horizons under two conditions: continued inaction, and adoption of the programme's Tier 1 initiative instruments. It is published at programme close and updated every two years by the expert council.

The Predictive Declaration is the programme's most powerful single counter to lobby noise. It shifts the burden of proof. When the programme publishes that "at current rates, the causal threshold for microplastic cardiovascular mortality will be crossed by year X, producing Y excess deaths per year" — scored at Fact/Opinion level B or C from the best available epidemiological evidence — the antagonist must now argue against the evidence, not against the programme. The declaration is not an opinion. It is a forecast built from the same methodology that actuaries and central banks use to make binding financial commitments.

The Predictive Declaration is richer and more sophisticated than any previous application of structured expert deliberation to plastic pollution futures. The RAND Corporation's original Delphi methodology was designed for military technology forecasting in the 1950s and has been applied to environmental policy in forms that are rarely multi-stakeholder, rarely longitudinal, and rarely combined with cross-impact scenario analysis. This programme combines four-round deliberative scoring, cross-impact consistency checking, coalition analysis, and adversarial deliberation over 24 months with real-world data feeds. The resulting futures analysis is in a different category from any previous environmental Delphi study.

2027–2028 · 2 years — The near-term horizon — what is already locked in

If nothing changes

- Virgin polymer prices normalise as shipping routes reopen. The recycled content investment made in 2026 is stranded as the economic case disappears.
- Recycling capacity that closed in 2023–2025 is not rebuilt. The 1 million tonne European capacity gap becomes permanent.
- A second major treaty negotiation round fails, citing the same irreconcilable differences as INC-5.
- Microplastic human health studies continue to accumulate. No regulatory body has yet acted on the cardiovascular evidence.
- Plastic production continues to grow at 3–4 percent per year. Annual leakage to environment: 33–34 million tonnes.

If the programme's Tier 1 initiatives are implemented

- If the production levy instrument is enacted during the current price window, the economic case is legislated before normalisation.
- Recycling infrastructure investment commitments lock in before the market signal disappears.
- Parliamentary engagement cascade has generated legislative pressure in at least 15 countries.
- Medical Declaration of 5,000+ named professionals creates the health credibility foundation for regulatory action.
- Iterative release of programme findings is entering public and institutional discourse.

2031 · 5 years — The medium-term horizon — compounding effects

If nothing changes

- Annual plastic production: approximately 540 million tonnes. Cumulative ocean plastic stock has grown by 150 million tonnes since the programme launched.
- The causal threshold for microplastic cardiovascular mortality has been crossed in peer-reviewed literature. Regulatory lag means no binding action has followed.
- At least two major plastic producer jurisdictions face class action litigation. Discovery processes have begun. Internal company documents are starting to emerge.
- Agricultural plastic contamination is measurable in food crops in 40+ countries. No food safety threshold has been set.
- The generation now entering primary school has the highest documented microplastic body burden in human history.

If the programme's Tier 1 initiatives are implemented

- Production levy has been enacted in three or more major jurisdictions, with border adjustment mechanisms under negotiation.
- Recycled content mandates have made recycling economically viable without price shock dependency.
- Municipal plastic cost audit data from 50+ cities has provided the evidence base for producer liability claims in multiple jurisdictions.
- The EXTINCTION Index shows measurable deceleration in plastic production growth in levy-implementing jurisdictions.
- The programme's findings are cited in at least three national legislative processes and two international regulatory consultations.

2036 · 10 years — The long-term horizon — structural divergence

If nothing changes

- Annual plastic production: approximately 620 million tonnes. Cumulative ocean stock has doubled from 2024 levels.
- Human microplastic exposure is now a measurable driver of cardiovascular disease burden in national health statistics. The cost is being carried by public health systems, not producers.
- Multiple major producer liability cases are in advanced litigation. Legal costs are beginning to affect producer valuations. The financial system is starting to price in contingent liability.
- Municipal governments in coastal and river delta regions are beginning to fail under clean-up cost burden.
- The political generation that entered office in 2025–2030 is now senior decision-makers. They carry microplastic exposure as a documented personal health issue.

If the programme's Tier 1 initiatives are implemented

- Production levy revenue has funded significant recycling infrastructure rebuild. The capacity gap of 2023–2025 has been more than recovered.
- The health cost of delayed action is documented in the Inaction Ledger and forms the basis of liability claims against producers who resisted intervention.
- The programme's coalition map has been used as a template for Season 2 (antibiotic resistance) programme design.
- Municipal cost audit data from 80+ cities forms a global database of plastic externalities available to litigation teams worldwide.
- The generation born with the highest microplastic loads is now 10–12 years old. The programme is cited in school curricula in twelve countries.

2051 · 25 years — The civilisational horizon — the world we choose

If nothing changes

- Cumulative plastic in the environment has tripled from 2024 levels. Remediation at scale is technically possible but economically equivalent to a major war mobilisation.
- Microplastic cardiovascular mortality is a measurable contributor to reduced life expectancy in high-exposure populations. The generation born in 2026 has the full expression of lifetime exposure in their health data.
- Producer liability litigation has produced settlements equivalent to the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement in at least five jurisdictions. The financial cost is socialised across all consumers through higher product prices. The environmental cost is paid by everyone.
- Multiple species extinction events are partially attributable to plastic contamination in food chains. The economic cost of marine ecosystem degradation exceeds the total value of the fishing industry.
- The window for avoiding these outcomes closed approximately in 2028–2030. The decision was made in the years when this programme was running.

If the programme's Tier 1 initiatives are implemented

- Production controls enacted in the mid-2020s have reduced annual plastic production to below 2020 levels. The contamination trajectory has bent.
- The health cost of the 2000–2026 period of inaction is documented and attributed. It is a permanent part of the historical record of corporate and governmental failure. The period of transition is also documented.
- The programme's 2026–2028 initiative instruments are cited as a turning point — not because they were perfect, but because they were the first time the full spectrum of affected stakeholders agreed on a ranked programme and delivered it into institutions that had agreed to receive it.
- The methodology has been applied to antibiotic resistance, biodiversity collapse, and two other civilisational-scale crises through subsequent seasons of the programme.
- The generation born in 2026 has a measurably lower plastic body burden than the generation born in 2016.

5 The Inaction Ledger

A running account of what delay costs — updated annually, published permanently

The Inaction Ledger is an annual publication that quantifies the cost of political inaction on plastic pollution in the year just passed. It is not a forecast. It is a running tab. It covers four categories of cost: environmental accumulation, health burden, economic externality, and governance failure. Every figure carries its Fact/Opinion audit score. Every figure is sourced and dated. It is published every April for as long as the programme or its successor institution operates.

The Inaction Ledger is designed to answer a specific type of political inaction with a specific type of evidence. When a government or industry representative claims that "more time is needed" or that "the evidence is not yet conclusive," the Ledger provides the cost of the time already spent waiting and the evidence that has already been ignored. It makes inaction legible, attributable, and expensive.

What the Ledger tracks annually

22 Mt	4.5×	+3–4%	€ X bn	0
Plastic leaked to environment this year	**Cardiovascular risk elevation**	**Annual production growth**	**Municipal clean-up cost**	**Binding international production controls**
Tonnes entering ocean, rivers, and soil annually	In people with arterial microplastic deposits (NEJM 2024)	Rate at which the problem is compounding	Estimated annual cost to public budgets (updated from audit data)	Number currently in force as of publication date

Ledger category	What is measured	Data source	Update frequency
Environmental accumulation	Total plastic entering the environment in the year: ocean, freshwater, terrestrial. New accumulation vs existing stock. Rate of change vs the previous year. Number of the programme's initiative instruments that would have reduced this figure if enacted.	OECD Global Plastics Outlook · CSIRO ocean debris studies · national environmental monitoring data where available	Annual, published April
Health burden	New peer-reviewed studies published on human health impacts. Current best estimate of cardiovascular, reproductive, and neurological burden attributable to microplastic exposure. Status of causal attribution in the scientific consensus (tracking towards threshold). Regulatory response in the year.	PubMed new publications · WHO disease burden data · national health statistics where available · Fact/Opinion scored at ingestion	Annual, published April with supplementary updates on major publications

Economic externality	Municipal clean-up costs reported by cities in the programme's audit network. Marine ecosystem service loss estimates. Healthcare cost attributable to microplastic exposure. Recycling industry investment foregone. Producer liability litigation costs to date.	Municipal audit data from The Poll Level D participants · OECD environmental economics · published litigation filings	Annual, with quarterly litigation update
Governance failure	Number of international policy mechanisms in which plastic pollution was on the agenda and no binding action resulted. Number of national legislative attempts that failed. Lobbying expenditure by producer associations in major jurisdictions where this data is publicly available.	Parliamentary records · lobbying disclosure registers · treaty process documentation	Annual, published April

The Inaction Ledger is not a polemical document. It is an annual data publication. Its power derives entirely from its evidential rigour: every figure is sourced, every assertion is Fact/Opinion scored, and the full methodology is published alongside the data. A critic who disagrees with a Ledger figure must engage with the data, not the programme's motivations.

6 The Possible Futures Study

What adoption looks like — the positive counterpart to the Inaction Ledger, produced from the programme's scenario work

The Possible Futures Study is the positive counterpart to the Inaction Ledger and the Predictive Declaration. Where those documents describe the costs of inaction and the trajectory of continued failure, the Possible Futures Study describes the world that the programme's initiative instruments are designed to produce if adopted. It is not a utopian projection. It is a scenario analysis built from the same structured expert deliberation data as the initiative instruments themselves.

The Possible Futures Study is the most sophisticated analytical output of the programme. It uses the Cross-Impact Balance analysis data — which maps how the ten policy variables in the programme interact and enable or constrain each other — to model the reachable future states that follow from different combinations of initiative adoption. It answers the question that institutional decision-makers actually need answered: not "should we act?" but "what specifically changes if we adopt initiative X, and what additional changes does that make possible?"

Structure of the Possible Futures Study

Section	Content	Analytical basis
Baseline scenario (no action)	Quantified projection of the plastic pollution system under continued inaction at 2, 5, 10, and 25 years. This is the reference scenario against which all initiative adoption scenarios are compared.	Cross-Impact Balance consistent scenario analysis. Fact/Opinion scored throughout. Updated from the Predictive Declaration.
Initiative adoption scenarios (5–8)	For each of the programme's Tier 1 initiative instruments, a modelled scenario of what changes at each time horizon if that instrument is adopted in isolation. What does the production levy alone achieve? What does the recycling infrastructure investment alone achieve? The scenarios show both the gains and the limits of single-instrument action.	Cross-Impact Balance scenario modelling. Stakeholder feedback from Voting Rounds and Matrix Assessment. Tier 3 specialist review (health, economics, materials science).
Combined adoption scenarios (3)	Three scenarios showing the combined effect of different initiative packages: the minimum viable package (the two or three instruments with the broadest stakeholder support); the optimal package (the combination the Cross-Impact analysis identifies as most internally consistent); and the maximum feasible package (all Tier 1 instruments adopted within a 10-year political window).	Cross-Impact Balance consistency checking. Multi-Criteria Mapping workshop outputs. Coalition map analysis.

Resistance and risk analysis	For each scenario, an explicit analysis of the resistance elements that would need to be overcome, the conditions under which they could be overcome, and the risk of partial adoption producing perverse incentives.	Regulator and Diplomat character outputs. Statement archive analysis. Tier 3 geopolitics and law specialist input.
The decision point map	A visual representation of the critical decision junctures in each scenario: the moments at which a different choice would have produced a different trajectory. Designed to make the decision architecture visible to policymakers who must make those choices.	Cross-Impact Balance transition analysis. Expert council review.

Why the Possible Futures Study is different from previous scenario work

The existing landscape of plastic pollution scenario analysis is dominated by two types of work. The first type is modelling studies that project current trajectories forward under various production and recycling assumptions, but do not incorporate the political economy of how change actually happens. The second type is advocacy scenario work that describes desirable futures without modelling the pathway from here to there or the stakeholder conditions required.

The Possible Futures Study is different in three structural ways. First, it is built from multi-stakeholder deliberation data, not from a single modelling team's assumptions. The scenarios reflect what the full range of affected stakeholders — including the producer and the regulator — believe is achievable and under what conditions. Second, it incorporates the cross-impact consistency checking of the Matrix Assessment, which means the scenarios it presents are internally coherent — they do not contain implicit contradictions that make them politically impossible. Third, it explicitly models the resistance elements as variables — not as fixed obstacles but as conditions that change under different political and market circumstances.

This is the power of the structured expert simulation approach , fully applied. The RAND Corporation's original Delphi studies were single-round, anonymous, and designed for technological forecasting by homogeneous expert panels. The Possible Futures Study is built from four rounds of deliberation by a heterogeneous stakeholder panel, cross-impact consistency checking, real-world data feeds over 24 months, and live adversarial deliberation in four structured events. It is the most analytically sophisticated plastic pollution futures analysis ever produced.

> *‘The programme does not predict the future. It maps the choices that lead to different futures, attributes the costs of the choices already made, and hands the map to the people who have to make the next ones. What they do with it is on them. That it exists at all — and that it was produced by the people who have to live with the consequences — is on us.’*

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What follows from reading this

You have now read the evidence. The medical evidence is in our blood and our children's. The economic case for recycling, as it has been sold, is dead. The policy interventions exist and have been costed. The architecture that would resolve a case of this shape has been mapped.

From this point you are an informed witness. That is the threshold.

The next question is not whether you care. The historical pattern is clear. Systemic harm has been resolved in every documented precedent (tobacco, asbestos, lead, opioids) not by enough people caring but by enough informed witnesses acting in ways small and large. The relevant distinction is not between those who care and those who do not. It is between those who act and those who do not. The difference is witnessed commitment, not feeling.

Three civic acts cross the threshold.

Vote. Vote for political representatives who will price the externality, build the levy, and pass the producer liability framework. Plastic is a political problem before it is a chemical one.

Vote in the Threshold poll. When the Knowledge Base presents the ranked interventions that emerge from the Althing Round, vote on them. The poll is the public record of which interventions citizens have endorsed.

Write your Pledge. If you care, show it. Write to your unborn grandchildren. Tell them what you knew. What you did. What you did not do. Tell them why they will live with the consequences. Seal it with your mark. Send it to the Threshold. We will hold it until the threshold is crossed, or until the year you have chosen, whichever comes first. This is the act that crosses your own. You will carry it forever.

The Threshold Effect is the pattern by which documented systemic harm crosses a threshold making it increasingly difficult to ignore, legally, medically, and politically, in documented historical cases, deliberately and systematically.

The case has crossed every threshold but yours.

Whether you cross it is now observed.